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Found 5 papers, 0 papers with code
First-Choice Maximality Meets Ex-ante and Ex-post Fairness
The generalized probabilistic Boston mechanism is also ex-post EF1, and satisfies ex-ante efficiency instead of fairness.
Favoring Eagerness for Remaining Items: Designing Efficient, Fair, and Strategyproof Mechanisms
In the assignment problem, the goal is to assign indivisible items to agents who have ordinal preferences, efficiently and fairly, in a strategyproof manner.
Sequential Mechanisms for Multi-type Resource Allocation
We study the relationship between properties of the local mechanisms, each responsible for assigning all of the resources of a designated type, and the properties of a sequential mechanism which is composed of these local mechanisms, one for each type, applied sequentially, under lexicographic preferences, a well studied model of preferences over multiple types of resources in artificial intelligence and economics.
Probabilistic Serial Mechanism for Multi-Type Resource Allocation
For MTRAs with divisible items, we show that the existing multi-type probabilistic serial (MPS) mechanism satisfies the stronger efficiency notion of lexi-efficiency, and is sd-envy-free under strict linear preferences, and sd-weak-strategyproof under lexicographic preferences.
Multi-type Resource Allocation with Partial Preferences
We propose multi-type probabilistic serial (MPS) and multi-type random priority (MRP) as extensions of the well known PS and RP mechanisms to the multi-type resource allocation problem (MTRA) with partial preferences.
