no code implementations • 2 May 2024 • Christopher P. Chambers, Federico Echenique, Takashi Hayashi
This paper studies manipulation of belief aggregation rules in the setting where the society first collects individual's probabilistic opinions and then solves a public portfolio choice problem with common utility based on the aggregate belief.
no code implementations • 20 Feb 2024 • Federico Echenique, Joseph Root, Fedor Sandomirskiy
We study matching markets with aligned preferences and establish a connection between common design objectives -- stability, efficiency, and fairness -- and the theory of optimal transport.
no code implementations • 19 Jan 2024 • Federico Echenique, Alejandro Robinson-Cortés, Leeat Yariv
We present an experimental study of decentralized two-sided matching markets with no transfers.
no code implementations • 14 Jan 2024 • Federico Echenique, Farzad Pourbabaee
We provide a quantitative assessment of welfare in the classical model of risk-sharing and exchange under uncertainty.
no code implementations • 23 May 2023 • Federico Echenique, Gerelt Tserenjigmid
We study the testable implications of models of dynamically inconsistent choices when planned choices are unobservable, and thus only "on path" data is available.
no code implementations • 27 Jan 2023 • Christopher P. Chambers, Federico Echenique, Nicolas S. Lambert
We provide sufficient conditions under which a utility function may be recovered from a finite choice experiment.
no code implementations • 17 Jan 2023 • Farzad Pourbabaee, Federico Echenique
We study mechanism design for public-good provision under a noisy privacy-preserving transformation of individual agents' reported preferences.
no code implementations • 16 Dec 2022 • Federico Echenique, Anqi Li
When information acquisition is costly but flexible, a principal may rationally acquire information that favors "majorities" over "minorities."
no code implementations • 12 Dec 2022 • Federico Echenique, Matías Núñez
We describe a two-stage mechanism that fully implements the set of efficient outcomes in two-agent environments with quasi-linear utilities.
no code implementations • 12 Mar 2022 • Federico Echenique, Joseph Root, Fedor Sandomirskiy
We study efficiency in general collective choice problems where agents have ordinal preferences and randomization is allowed.
no code implementations • 10 Feb 2022 • Hamed Hamze Bajgiran, Federico Echenique
We study the complexity of closure operators, with applications to machine learning and decision theory.
no code implementations • 9 Feb 2022 • Federico Echenique, Sumit Goel, SangMok Lee
We study stable allocations in an exchange economy with indivisible goods.
no code implementations • 13 Sep 2021 • Federico Echenique
This note provides a critical discussion of the \textit{Critical Cost-Efficiency Index} (CCEI) as used to assess deviations from utility-maximizing behavior.
no code implementations • 6 Aug 2021 • Christopher P Chambers, Federico Echenique
Welfare economics relies on access to agents' utility functions: we revisit classical questions in welfare economics, assuming access to data on agents' past choices instead of their utilities.
no code implementations • 16 Mar 2021 • Federico Echenique, Kevin He
Uninformed $p$-hackers, who are fully ignorant of the true mechanism and engage in data mining, often fall for baits.
no code implementations • 4 Mar 2021 • Christopher P. Chambers, Federico Echenique, Alan D. Miller
We characterize decreasing impatience, a common behavioral phenomenon in intertemporal choice.
no code implementations • 12 Feb 2021 • Federico Echenique, Kota Saito, Taisuke Imai
We apply our methodology to data from three large-scale experiments.
no code implementations • 8 Feb 2021 • Federico Echenique, Alfred Galichon
We characterize solutions for two-sided matching, both in the transferable and in the nontransferable-utility frameworks, using a cardinal formulation.
no code implementations • 29 Dec 2020 • Federico Echenique, Masaki Miyashita, Yuta Nakamura, Luciano Pomatto, Jamie Vinson
We propose a model of incomplete \textit{twofold multiprior preferences}, in which an act $f$ is ranked above an act $g$ only when $f$ provides higher utility in a worst-case scenario than what $g$ provides in a best-case scenario.
no code implementations • 13 Feb 2020 • Federico Echenique, Ruy Gonzalez, Alistair Wilson, Leeat Yariv
Most doctors in the NRMP are matched to one of their most-preferred internship programs.
no code implementations • 12 Nov 2019 • Federico Echenique, Siddharth Prasad
We consider active learning under incentive compatibility constraints.
no code implementations • 3 Nov 2019 • Federico Echenique, Taisuke Imai, Kota Saito
We implement nonparametric revealed-preference tests of subjective expected utility theory and its generalizations.
no code implementations • 12 Sep 2019 • Christopher P. Chambers, Federico Echenique, Nicolas Lambert
We study preferences estimated from finite choice experiments and provide sufficient conditions for convergence to a unique underlying "true" preference.
no code implementations • 12 Sep 2019 • Federico Echenique, Antonio Miralles, Jun Zhang
We propose a pseudo-market solution to resource allocation problems subject to constraints.