1 code implementation • 4 Jan 2019 • Daniel Gruss, Erik Kraft, Trishita Tiwari, Michael Schwarz, Ari Trachtenberg, Jason Hennessey, Alex Ionescu, Anders Fogh
We present a new hardware-agnostic side-channel attack that targets one of the most fundamental software caches in modern computer systems: the operating system page cache.
Cryptography and Security
2 code implementations • 13 Nov 2018 • Claudio Canella, Jo Van Bulck, Michael Schwarz, Moritz Lipp, Benjamin von Berg, Philipp Ortner, Frank Piessens, Dmitry Evtyushkin, Daniel Gruss
Our systematization does not only yield a complete picture of the attack surface, but also allows a systematic evaluation of defenses.
Cryptography and Security
2 code implementations • 27 Jul 2018 • Michael Schwarz, Martin Schwarzl, Moritz Lipp, Daniel Gruss
Beyond retrofitting existing attacks to a network scenario, we also demonstrate the first Spectre attack which does not use a cache covert channel.
Cryptography and Security
2 code implementations • 3 Jan 2018 • Moritz Lipp, Michael Schwarz, Daniel Gruss, Thomas Prescher, Werner Haas, Stefan Mangard, Paul Kocher, Daniel Genkin, Yuval Yarom, Mike Hamburg
The security of computer systems fundamentally relies on memory isolation, e. g., kernel address ranges are marked as non-accessible and are protected from user access.
Cryptography and Security
2 code implementations • 14 Nov 2015 • Daniel Gruss, Clémentine Maurice, Klaus Wagner, Stefan Mangard
The Flush+Flush attack runs in a higher frequency and thus is faster than any existing cache attack.
Cryptography and Security
