no code implementations • 30 May 2023 • Vasilis Gkatzelis, Mohamad Latifian, Nisarg Shah
The input to the voting rule is each agent's ranking of the alternatives from most to least preferred, yet the agents have more refined (cardinal) preferences that capture the intensity with which they prefer one alternative over another.
no code implementations • 24 May 2021 • Artem Baklanov, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin
We study the classic problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among a group of agents, and focus on the notion of approximate proportionality known as PROPm.
no code implementations • 20 Sep 2020 • Artem Baklanov, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods and focus on the classic fairness notion of proportionality.
no code implementations • 16 Apr 2020 • Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Halpern, Nisarg Shah
We study the following metric distortion problem: there are two finite sets of points, $V$ and $C$, that lie in the same metric space, and our goal is to choose a point in $C$ whose total distance from the points in $V$ is as small as possible.
no code implementations • 4 Jun 2019 • Ke Yang, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Julia Stoyanovich
Many set selection and ranking algorithms have recently been enhanced with diversity constraints that aim to explicitly increase representation of historically disadvantaged populations, or to improve the overall representativeness of the selected set.