no code implementations • 22 May 2024 • Mark Whitmeyer, Cole Williams
For three natural classes of dynamic decision problems; 1. additively separable problems, 2. discounted problems, and 3. discounted problems for a fixed discount factor; we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for one sequential experiment to dominate another in the sense that the dominant experiment is preferred to the other for any decision problem in the specified class.
no code implementations • 13 May 2024 • Konstantin von Beringe, Mark Whitmeyer
In order to study updating rules, we consider the problem of a malevolent principal screening an imperfectly Bayesian agent.
no code implementations • 1 Apr 2024 • Mark Whitmeyer
A natural way of quantifying the ``amount of information'' in decision problems yields a globally concave value for information.
no code implementations • 10 Mar 2024 • Mark Whitmeyer
We explore the connection between an agent's decision problem and her ranking of information structures.
no code implementations • 19 Feb 2024 • Pak Hung Au, Mark Whitmeyer
We study the ramifications of increased commitment power for information provision in an oligopolistic market with search frictions.
no code implementations • 26 Oct 2023 • Marilyn Pease, Mark Whitmeyer
We introduce a way to compare actions in decision problems.
no code implementations • 29 Mar 2023 • Mark Whitmeyer
A sender with state-independent preferences (i. e., transparent motives) privately observes a signal about the state of the world before sending a message to a receiver, who subsequently takes an action.
no code implementations • 28 Mar 2023 • Mark Whitmeyer, Kun Zhang
We revisit Popper's falsifiability criterion.
no code implementations • 27 Feb 2023 • Mark Whitmeyer
There are updating rules other than Bayes' law that render the value of information positive.
no code implementations • 13 Feb 2023 • Brian C. Albrecht, Mark Whitmeyer
We explore a model of duopolistic competition in which consumers learn about the fit of each competitor's product.
no code implementations • 10 Oct 2022 • Mark Whitmeyer
We study what changes to an agent's decision problem increase her value for information.
no code implementations • 9 Aug 2022 • Mark Whitmeyer, Kun Zhang
When acquisition is covert, the receiver does not.
no code implementations • 10 Feb 2022 • Mark Whitmeyer, Kun Zhang
A principal hires an agent to acquire soft information about an unknown state.
no code implementations • 19 Nov 2021 • Vasudha Jain, Mark Whitmeyer
Law enforcement acquires costly evidence with the aim of securing the conviction of a defendant, who is convicted if a decision-maker's belief exceeds a certain threshold.
no code implementations • 30 Aug 2021 • Mark Whitmeyer
This paper investigates stochastic continuous time contests with a twist: the designer requires that contest participants incur some cost to submit their entries.
no code implementations • 27 Apr 2021 • Vasudha Jain, Mark Whitmeyer
We modify the standard model of price competition with horizontally differentiated products, imperfect information, and search frictions by allowing consumers to flexibly acquire information about a product's match value during their visits.
no code implementations • 27 Nov 2020 • Mark Whitmeyer
This paper extends the sequential search model of Wolinsky (1986) by allowing firms to choose how much match value information to disclose to visiting consumers.
no code implementations • 3 Feb 2019 • Mark Whitmeyer
We study how a decision-maker can acquire more information from an agent by reducing her own ability to observe what the agent transmits.
no code implementations • 26 Feb 2018 • Pak Hung Au, Mark Whitmeyer
We consider a model of oligopolistic competition in a market with search frictions, in which competing firms with products of unknown quality advertise how much information a consumer's visit will glean.
Probability Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics Economics