No truthful mechanism can be better than $n$ approximate for two natural problems

30 May 2018  ·  Leucci Stefano, Mamageishvili Akaki, Penna Paolo ·

This work gives the first natural non-utilitarian problems for which the trivial $n$ approximation via VCG mechanisms is the best possible. That is, no truthful mechanism can be better than $n$ approximate, where $n$ is the number of agents... The problems are the min-max variant of shortest path and (directed) minimum spanning tree mechanism design problems. In these procurement auctions, agents own the edges of a network, and the corresponding edge costs are private. Instead of the total weight of the subnetwork, in the min-max variant we aim to minimize the maximum agent cost. read more

PDF Abstract
No code implementations yet. Submit your code now


Computer Science and Game Theory


  Add Datasets introduced or used in this paper