Incentive Compatibility in Stochastic Dynamic Systems

29 Apr 2020  ·  Ma Ke, Kumar P. R. ·

While the classic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism ensures incentive compatibility for a static one-shot game, it does not appear to be feasible to construct a dominant truth-telling mechanism for agents that are stochastic dynamic systems. The contribution of this paper is to show that for a set of LQG agents a mechanism consisting of a sequence of layered payments over time decouples the intertemporal effect of current bids on future payoffs and ensures truth-telling of dynamic states by their agents, if system parameters are known and agents are rational... Additionally, it is shown that there is a "Scaled" VCG mechanism that simultaneously satisfies incentive compatibility, social efficiency, budget balance as well as individual rationality under a certain "market power balance" condition where no agent is too negligible or too dominant. A further desirable property is that the SVCG payments converge to the Lagrange payments, the payments corresponding to the true price in the absence of strategic considerations, as the number of agents in the market increases. For LQ but non-Gaussian agents the optimal social welfare over the class of linear control laws is achieved. read more

PDF Abstract
No code implementations yet. Submit your code now


Systems and Control


  Add Datasets introduced or used in this paper